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#2A-3/ll/88 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
THOMAS C. BARRY, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9835 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Respondent. 
THOMAS C. BARRY, pro se 
BERNARD F. ASHE, ESQ. (IVOR R. MOSKOWITZ, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
In this improper practice charge, Thomas C. Barry, the 
charging party, alleges that the United University 
Professions (UUP) violated the Public Employees* Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it adopted an agency shop fee 
refund procedure for its 1988-89 fiscal year which contains 
no provision "for the advance refund payment to all 'agency 
fee payers' as required by the principle of the [Board's] 
order of 8 July 1987" in UUP (Barry, Eson and Gallup), 20 
PERB f3 039 (1987). The charging party asserts that, to the 
extent the Board approved the UUP 1988-89 procedure without 
this provision, it did so in violation of its own decision 
and order. In that case, we found that UUP's agency fee 
refund procedure violated the Act in certain respects. We 
ordered UUP to present to the Board for approval a new 
11439 
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procedure, to be fully in place for the 1988-89 fiscal year, 
which conformed with our decision. UUP subsequently 
presented a proposed procedure which was approved, with 
certain conditions, later satisfied, by Board decision dated 
September 17, 1987.A/ 
The Director dismissed the instant charge upon the 
ground that implicit in the approval by the Board of the at-
issue 1988-89 procedure is a determination that the procedure 
presented by UUP conforms with the Board's decision of 
July 8, 1987. 
At the outset, we note that, contrary to the contention 
of the charging party, we did not, in our July 8 decision, 
direct UUP to make an advance reduction payment to all agency 
fee payers. In fact, we stated that UUP must make a payment 
to all agency fee payers if, and only if, it chooses to make 
a single lump sum payment of the advance reduction at the 
same time as it issues its determination of the amount of 
the advance reduction payment. Alternatively, UUP would 
have, under our decision, the opportunity to make an advance 
reduction payment to objecting agency fee payers only, so 
long as the advance reduction determination was communicated 
to all agency fee payers prior to the objection period. In 
promulgating its 1988-89 procedure, UUP selected the latter 
rather than the former alternative. 
V 2 0 PERB 53 052, 11440 
Board - U-9835 -3 
Based upon the foregoing, it was and is our determina-
tion that the agency fee refund procedure promulgated by UUP 
for the 1988-89 fiscal year is in conformity with our July 8 
decision and order. In any event, even if the charging party 
were correct in his assertion that the two are in conflict 
with each other, the proper method for challenging the 
allegedly nonconforming procedure would have been by way of 
review of the Board's order approving the procedure rather 
than by way of a separate improper practice charge. 
Based upon the foregoing, the decision of the Director 
dismissing the charge is affirmed, and the charge is hereby 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: March 11, 1988 
Albany, New York 
'Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
U^^^-




STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SHELDON SETH HAAS, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9850 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK and 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Respondents. 
SHELDON SETH HAAS, pro se 
) BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charging party, Sheldon Seth Haas, excepts to the 
dismissal, as deficient, of his charge against the Board of 
Education of the City School District of the City of New York 
(District) and the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, 
AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT) by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director). The charge alleges 
that the District and the UFT, each failed and refused to 
negotiate in good faith in violation of §209-a.l(d) and 
§209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act 
(Act), respectively. In particular, Haas alleges in his 
charge that negotiations between the parties were not begun 
) at the appropriate time, did not include subjects which are 
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customarily raised by parties during collective bargaining, 
and were conducted without consultation with certain 
bargaining unit employees. 
The Director dismissed the charge upon the ground that 
an individual has no standing to file a charge alleging a 
failure to "negotiate in good faith on the part of either an 
employer or an employee organization, citing our decision in 
Board of Education of the Citv School District of the City of 
New York and United Federation of Teachers
 r Local 2, 19 PERB 
53006 (1986). In that case, which was also filed by the 
charging party herein, we held that "the obligation that 
recognized or certified employee organizations and the 
appropriate public employers owe to each other to negotiate 
in good faith is exclusive; neither one owes such a duty to 
an individual public employee and no public employee has 
standing to bring a charge alleging a violation of the duty 
to negotiate in good faith" (19 PERB ^3006, at 3010) . In so 
holding, we cited State of New York, 13 PERB f3063 (1980). 
As we noted in Board of Education, supra, a claim of a 
violation of a union's duty of fair representation is 
cognizable under §209-a.2(a) of the Act, and a claim of 
improper collusive arrangements between the employer and 
union might give rise to a charge of violation of §209-a.l(a) 
or (b) of the Act. However, none of these sections, nor any 
facts in support of a claimed violation of these sections, is 
11443 
Board - U-9850 -: 
presented in the instant case. .The sole allegations 
contained in the charge relate to a claimed failure to 
negotiate in good faith. 
Based upon our prior holding, WE AFFIRM the decision of 
the Director dismissing the instant charge upon the ground 
that the charging party is without standing to allege a 
failure to negotiate in good faith, and ORDER that the 
charge be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: March 11, 1988 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Y. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME/AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-9130 
-and-
SPENCER-VAN ETTEN CENTRAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
MARJORIE E. KAROWE, ESQ., General Counsel, CSEA Law 
Department (PAUL D. CLAYTON, ESQ. of Counsel), for 
Charging Party 
SAYLES, EVANS, BRAYTON, PALMER & TIFFT, ESQS. (JAMES F. 
YOUNG, ESQ. of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME/AFL-CIO (CSEA) filed a charge against Spencer-Van Etten 
Central school District (District) alleging that the District 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it unilaterally subcontracted work performed by a unit 
employee, thereafter abolished that employee's position and 
refused CSEA's demand to negotiate the impact of its actions. 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the District 
violated the Act when it subcontracted one aspect of the 
employee's work and when it failed to respond to the impact 
11445 
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demand of CSEA. However, he found no merit to the charge that 
the District violated the Act by abolishing the employee's 
position, concluding that the abolition of the position was not 
caused by the subcontracting of the unit work. The ALT ordered 
the District to restore the subcontracted duties to a position 
within CSEA's unit and to respond to CSEA's impact demand and 
negotiate with CSEA, but declined to award any back pay to the 
employee whose position was abolished. 
The matter comes to us on the exceptions of CSEA to that 
part only of the AKJ's decision refusing to award back pay to the 
affected employee. The District has not filed any exceptions to 
the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The employee in question, Donna Giannino, was employed as a 
"district driver". As such, her duties were four-fold: a 
morning school bus run of students; a morning trip to transport 
food to the cafeteria and mail and banking materials; an 
afternoon run, on the District's garbage bus, transporting trash 
to a landfill; and an afternoon school bus run of students. The 
dispute, in this case, centers on the subcontracting of 
Giannino's trash run. 
Under-the circumstances set forth in the ALJ's decision, the 
District unilaterally subcontracted the trash run to a private 
carrier on June 24, 1986, commencing September 1, 1986. The ALJ 
11446 
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found that, in doing so, the District violated its negotiating 
obligation under the Act. On August 28, 1986, the District 
abolished Giannino's district driver position as a result of 
1) elimination of the trash run; 2) elimination of the position's 
busroute as acost-savingmeasure; 3) rearrangement of mail 
delivery responsibilities, including assignment to another unit 
employee; and 4) assignment of the food distribution duties to 
another unit employee. The ALT credited the testimony on behalf 
of the District that the prime motivating factor for the 
abolition of the position was the economic savings which would 
result therefrom. 
Having found that the elimination of Giannino's position was 
not improper, and inasmuch as the trash run constituted less than 
25% of the duties of the district driver position, the ALT 
concluded that a remedy requiring reestablishment of the district 
driver position would be inappropriate. He found it appropriate, 
however, to direct the District to restore the trash run duties 
of the former district driver position to a position within the 
CSEA unit. 
In its exceptions, CSEA asserts that Giannino should be paid 
what she would have received had she performed her trash run 
duties during the 1986-87 school year, after her position was 
eliminated. 
11447 
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DISCUSSION 
We affirm the ALJ's conclusion that the "restitution" 
claimed by CSEA on behalf of Giannino is not warranted in light 
of his unchallenged findings that the district driver position 
was properly eliminated and that Giannino would not have been 
retained to perform only the trash run. 
The ALJ also properly noted that Giannino had rejected an 
offer of alternative full-time employment as a bus driver for the 
District. He relied on a decision of ours-3=/ in which we found 
that reimbursement to affected employees for lost wages would not 
be appropriate where they rejected an offer for alternative 
employment that was substantially equivalent to the eliminated 
positions. CSEA argues that Giannino was not offered a 
substantially equivalent position, asserting that, although she 
was offered a full-time position, the job only paid for 7 hours 
of work, while her former position paid for 8-1/2 hours of work. 
In view of our primary conclusion, we need not treat with the 
argument other than to observe that the District's offer far 
exceeded the percentage of Giannino's work day attributable to 
the at-issue trash removal duties. 
We do not need to consider the District's argument that 
CSEA's exceptions should be dismissed by virtue of the fact that, 
in response to the ALJ's order, CSEA and the District conducted 
-^Hilton CSD, 14 PERB 13038 (1981). 
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negotiations and signed a memorandum of understanding resolving 
all issues in this dispute. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that CSEA's exceptions be, and they 
hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: March 11, 1988 
Albany, New York 
M^ 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
r Hm 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
"^  PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NIAGARA COUNTY UNIT, LOCAL 832, 
CSEA, INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U^8615 
-and-
COUNTY OF NIAGARA (MOUNT VIEW HEALTH 
FACILITY), 
Respondent. 
MARJORIE E. KAROWE, ESQ., General Counsel, CSEA Law 
Department (PAMELA NORRIX-TURNER, ESQ. of Counsel), for 
Charging Party 
GLENN S. HACKETT, ESQ., Niagara County Attorney 
r*N (VINCENT R. GINESTRE, ESQ. of Counsel), for Respondent 
J 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the County of 
Niagara (Mount View Health Facility) (County or Facility) and the 
cross-exceptions of the Niagara County Unit, Local 832, CSEA, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to the decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sustaining an improper practice 
charge filed by CSEA. CSEA charged that the Facility violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
unilaterally promulgating a memorandum reducing the areas in 
which unit employees could smoke. 
J 
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FACTS 
The ALT'S extensive findings of fact are not challenged and, 
accordingly, we adopt and summarize them as follows. 
The Facility is a 172-bed, skilled nursing facility, housing 
"long-term" patients below the level of acute care and providing 
specialized treatment to out-patients. The mean age of the 
Facility's resident patient population is 82 years. Approxi-
mately 15% of the residents are ambulatory. 
On February 4, 1986, the Facility issued a memorandum 
regarding smoking in the Facility. Prior to its issuance, 
employees were allowed to smoke in the Facility's main lobby, 
first floor library, basement cafeteria and front outdoor 
entranceway on their break and lunch periods. The memorandum 
banned employee smoking in the main lobby, library and basement 
cafeteria, and permitted smoking only in the basement rest rooms 
and front door entranceway. Patients are housed in the second 
to fifth floors of the Facility, and employees have never been 
allowed to smoke on these floors, although^patients may, under 
supervision, smoke in the dining rooms on those floors. 
The lobby is used by patients with visitors, is carpeted and 
contains stuffed chairs, and is staffed by a receptionist 90% of 
the time. The library is adjacent to the lobby, contains books 
and stuffed furniture, is carpeted and is not readily observable 
from the outside. The library is not used by patients. The 
basement cafeteria is used by Facility employees, non-facility 
11451 
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employees of the County, visitors and out-patients. It is one 
room, approximately 20' x 20'. The basement rest rooms are 
approximately 16' x 11-1/2', poorly lit and inadequately 
ventilated. 
The Facility's ban on smoking in these areas was prompted by 
its concern for the health hazards attributable to second-hand 
smoke, fire safety considerations and employee complaints. The 
Facility submitted, for our consideration, Part 25 - Regulation 
of Smoking - of the Rules and Regulations of the Public Health 
Council issued on February 6, 1987, which, among other things, 
sets forth findings of the Council regarding the hazards of 
second-hand smoke. As to fire hazards, a fire official has 
recommended to the Facility that smoking be limited to areas 
which are readily observable by other parties and are removed 
from patient housing. It was suggested by that official that the 
first floor be a "buffer" floor. Another fire official testified 
that the lobby and cafeteria would be safe for smoking if 
supervised at all times. He noted that the library was not an 
observable area. 
In addition, the Facility has received, over the years, a 
number of complaints from employees, visitors, patients and non-
facility employees of the County regarding smoking in the at-
issue areas. These complaints have been referred to the 
Facility's Safety Committee and Policy Committee. The Safety 
Committee reviews Facility safety and consists of a 
11452 
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representative group of employees. The Policy Committee 
establishes policies and procedures for patient care, including 
the environment of the Facility. The Policy Committee consists 
of the Facility's administrator, representatives of the 
professional employees and of the housekeeping and buirding and 
grounds departments. The Policy Committee reviewed and approved 
the at-issue memorandum prior to its promulgation. 
ALJ DECISION 
The ABJ determined that the Facility's imposition of a 
smoking ban in the lobby, library and cafeteria contravened its 
duty to negotiate and violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act. The ALJ 
rejected the argument that the Public Health Council's 
February 6, 1987 regulations are an expression of New York State 
public policy on the subject of the health hazards of second-hand 
smoke. She also found no freestanding public policy supporting 
j-
the right of the Facility to act unilaterally in the matter. 
Accordingly, she applied a balancing test to determine whether 
smoking rules, as work rules, can be promulgated unilaterally by 
the Facility. Balancing the employees' interests in the subject 
and the employer's concerns, she concluded that the employer has 
not considered reasonable alternatives to the ban on smoking 
which it established and that, accordingly, the balance must be 
struck in favor of the employees' negotiating rights. 
11453 
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EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the County urges that, in applying our 
balancing test, more weight must be given to the mission of the 
Facility, which is charged with the responsibility for the care 
of the medical and environmental needs of elderly patients and 
out-patients, all of whom suffer from chronic long-term illness. 
Protecting these patients from a significant health hazard is, 
the County argues, directly related to its mission. 
The County also asserts that the evidence that second-hand 
smoke is a significant health hazard is now more compelling than 
it was at the time of the decision in Steuben-Allegany BOCES, 
13 PERB 53096, aff'g 13 PERB f4552 (1980). In this regard, the 
County states that it relies on the Public Health Council's 
regulations, not as a statement of public policy or as a precise 
standard for establishing no-smoking regulations, but as evidence 
that second-hand smoke has been found to be hazardous to health, 
especially to the elderly ill. 
In its cross-exceptions, CSEA urges affirmance of the ALJ's 
conclusion that this case deals with "employees' use of their 
free time while on the job" and that this is a work rule that was 
unilaterally promulgated in violation of the employer's duty to 
negotiate. It also urges, however, that any suggestion in the 
ALJ's decision that alternatives to the total ban might be 
acceptable without negotiations should be rejected by the Board. 
11454 
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DISCUSSION 
The County states that it does not rely on the Public Health 
Council's Rules and Regulations as a statement of public policy 
regarding second-hand smoke. In light of the recent decision of 
the Court of Appealsi/ holding that the Public Health Council 
exceeded its authority when it issued its smoking regulations, we 
obviously Cannot conclude that those regulations preempt or 
supersede any bargaining obligations under the Taylor Law with 
respect to the implementation of smoking regulations. Nor does 
the County urge that there is any freestanding public policy 
which would insulate it from the duty to negotiate the smoking 
regulations which it imposed, to the extent that the Taylor Law 
) requires such negotiations. 
Since there is no public policy, as yet, which requires or 
permits a public employer to ban smoking in the work place or in 
its facilities, we continue to believe that employee smoking 
regulations are work rules subject to the balancing test which we 
have previously employed-^/ to determine whether unilaterally 
promulgated work rules violate the Act. Smoking regulations 
affect terms and conditions of employment, and the record in 
this case establishes the nature of the inconvenience to the 
employees. 
1/Boreali v. Axelrod. 71N.Y.2d 1 (1987). 
-2/see, e.g. . County of Rensselaer, 13 PERB J[3080 (1980) ; 
} Steuben-Allegany BOCES, 13 PERB 53096 (1980); State of New York, 
v
 18 PERB f3064 (1985). 
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What we stated in County of Montgomery,-3-/ regarding our 
balancing test, bears repetition: 
Implicit in this [balancing] test is the 
recognition that simply because a work rule 
relates to the employer's mission, it does 
not follow that the employer is necessarily 
free to act unilaterally in the manner in 
which it chooses to act. If it is faced with 
an objectively demonstrable need to act in 
furtherance of its mission, the employer may 
unilaterally impose work rules which are 
related to that need, but only to the extent 
that its action does not significantly or 
unnecessarily intrude on the protected 
interests of its employees. Thus, we must 
weigh the need for the particular action 
taken by the employer against the extent to 
which that action impacts on the employees' 
working conditions. 
In order to be accorded the right to act unilaterally 
insofar as smoking regulations are concerned, a public employer 
must demonstrate that there is a need related to its mission for 
the restrictions which it imposed on employee smoking in its 
facilities. '4/ Further, the employer must show that those 
restrictions do not go beyond what is needed to further its 
mission. 
In support of its claim of prerogative, the County stresses 
its role and duty as a health care facility, the mean age and 
infirmities of its clientele, and its physical setup. It relies 
2/18 PERB 53077 at 3167 (1985). 
•4-/This Board's powers relate solely to the enforcement of .the 
interests protected by the Act. We are not empowered to 
protect the interests of the non-smoking public who may have 
access to the facilities of the employer. 
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Board - U-8615 -8 
on evidence of the health hazards posed to its clientele and 
others by environmental tobacco smoke, and by potential fire 
hazards in its building. 
In this regard, the County argues that, while the Public 
Health Council's regulations may not have set the public policy 
of the State of New York, the Council's findings as to the 
hazards of second-hand smoke, particularly with regard to elderly 
people and people suffering from chronic long-term illness, 
should be accepted. We agree with the ALT that the Council's 
findings, in this regard, are not, on this record, in question. 
We conclude that the record, in this case, presents a compelling 
situation for finding a direct relationship between mission and 
smoking regulations. A health facility treating the elderly ill 
may, in furtherance of its mission, ban smoking by its employees 
in those areas of its facilities which are customarily used by 
its patients. 
The areas of the Facility in dispute, in this case, are the 
lobby and the library on the first floor and the cafeteria. The 
lobby is visited regularly by patients. The other two locations 
are not.-^ / We do not consider it appropriate for us to question 
whether the use of the lobby by patients is in furtherance of the 
employer's mission. Inasmuch as that area has, in the past, been 
used by resident patients, we accept that such use is in 
^/There is some evidence that some out-patients do use the 
basement cafeteria. 
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furtherance of the Facility's mission. Accordingly, we conclude 
that the banning of smoking by employees in the lobby was 
directly related to the County's mission and did not go beyond 
what is needed to further that mission. 
It has not been demonstratedin thisrecord,however, that 
the employer's prerogative to protect its patients from the 
health hazards of second-hand smoke warranted the unilateral 
imposition on the employees of a smoking ban in the library and 
cafeteria. The library is a separate, enclosed room, not 
customarily used by patients. The cafeteria is also not used by 
resident patients. Its use by some out-patients does not warrant 
the significant intrusion on the protected interests of the unit 
employees by the at-issue memorandum. The access of outpatients 
to the cafeteria appears to be no different in nature than that 
of the public generally. 
There remains for consideration the Facility's argument that 
its mission also includes the protection of its patients and 
facilities from fire hazards. The ALJ agreed that the potential 
fire hazard to the lobby and library is "a verified and serious 
concern... and goes beyond unit employee safety". Nevertheless, 
the ALJ found that a total ban on employee smoking at these two 
locations was not established as necessary to meet the employer's 
fire safety concerns. She concluded that fire safety concerns 
can give rise to a right to unilateral action only if the employer 
demonstrates that the need can only be met by the action taken. 
11458 
Board - U-8615 -10 
We agree that reliance on fire safety concerns to justify 
the unilateral imposition of a total ban on smoking in an 
employer's facility or in particular locations in the facility 
can only be proper if based on objectively demonstrable need. In 
our view, the testimbhy in this regard is, at best, ambiguous. 
The fire officials1 statements were recommendations only. The 
need for a "buffer" floor can be questioned in light of the 
permission "granted to patients to smoke in the upper floors * 
dining areas. The library, a non-public, non-working area, 
appears to have been used at break and lunch time as an employee 
smoking lounge. There is little in this record to support the 
conclusion that fire safety concerns justify the unilateral 
imposition of a smoking ban in the basement cafeteria. We agree 
with the ALJ that reasonable alternatives to a total ban on 
smoking in the library and cafeteria to meet fire safety concerns 
were not considered or negotiated. For these reasons, we affirm 
the ALJ's determination with regard to the library and cafeteria. 
In response to CSEA's cross-exceptions, we wish to emphasize 
that, in making these findings, we are concerned only with 
determining whether aspects of employee smoking regulations 
should or should not be negotiated. We express no opinion as to 
the need for or desirability of such regulations. We do believe 
that the bilateral negotiating process mandated by the Act is a 
viable means for resolving many of the conflicting interests 
related to employee smoking bans. 
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Accordingly, we find that the Facility violated §209-a.l(d) 
of the Act to the extent that its February 4, 1986 memorandum 
banned smoking in the library and basement cafeteria. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the County of Niagara (Mount 
View Health Facility): 
1. Immediately rescind and cease enforcement or 
implementation of its February 4, 1986 memorandum and its 
practice thereunder, in regard to the library and cafeteria; 
2. Immediately remove and destroy all disciplinary 
documents issued pursuant to said memorandum and/or practice, in 
regard to the library and cafeteria, from any files kept or 
maintained by the County or its agents; 
3. Negotiate in good faith with the CSEA with respect to 
terms and conditions of employment of unit employees; and 
4. Sign and post notice in the form attached at all 
locations ordinarily used to post written communications to unit 
employees. 
DATED: March 11, 1988 
Albany, New York 
~jU»*c42fe -tJs. 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 




THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and In ©rdir I© $ftsciu*l# th« policlte©I th# 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
w» hereby notify all employees of the County of Niagara (Mount View 
Health Facility) in the unit represented by the Niagara County 
Unit. Local 832. CSEA. Inc.. Local 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO that 
the County: 
1. Will immediate rescind and cease enforcement or 
implementation of its February 4. 1986 memorandum and its 
practice the; ^ under. in regard to the library and cafeteria; 
2. Will immediate remove and destroy all disciplinary 
documents issued pursuant to said memorandum and/or practice, in 
regard to the library and cafeteria, from any files kept or 
maintained by the County or its agents; 
3. Negotiate, in good faith with the CSEA with respect 
to terms and conditions of employment of unit employees. 
County of Niagara 
(Mount View Health Facility) 
Dated (B»pr»s*ntativ») (TltW) 
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This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altere 
defaced, or covered by any other materia!. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MORRIS E. ESON, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-952 0 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Respondent. 
GLENN M. TAUBMAN, ESQ., for Charging Party 
BERNARD F. ASHE, ESQ. (IVOR R. MOSKOWITZ, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Morris E. Eson, charging party, excepts to certain 
portions of an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) decision in 
connection with an improper practice charge alleging 
violations of §209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees1 Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by the United University Professions 
(UUP). In particular, the charge asserts that UUP failed to 
give charging party notice of its agency fee refund procedure 
for the 1987-88 fiscal year, and failed to provide him with 
financial information upon which an advance reduction payment 
for the 1987-88 fiscal year was based prior to the period for 
filing objections to the use of agency fees for purposes 
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impermissible under the Act.^/ The charge also alleges that 
the UUP procedure itself violates the Act because it does not 
provide for financial disclosure before the objection filing 
period. 
The ALT found that charging party was not provided with 
a copy of UUP's agency fee rebate procedure for 1987-88 
because his name did not appear in the listing of current 
employees used by UUP for its mailing which was provided by 
the State of New York (employer) immediately prior to the 
publication of the newspaper containing the description of 
UUP's agency fee refund procedure. Charging party was not 
included in the list provided by the employer because he was 
at the time on a six-month leave-without-pay from the 
employer. The ALT found that UUP's reliance upon the list of 
current employees provided by the employer was not 
inappropriate under the Act and that the omission of charging 
party from the mailing list could not be attributed to any 
fault, negligence or error by UUP. The ALT accordingly 
dismissed that portion of the charge. 
^/section 208.3(a) of the Act requires employee 
organizations collecting agency shop fees to establish and 
maintain a^procedure which provides "for the refund to any 
employee demanding the return [of] any part of an agency shop 
fee deduction which represents the employee's pro rata share 
of expenditures by the organization in aid of activities or 
causes of a political or ideological nature only incidentally 
related to terms and conditions of employment." 
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The second claim made by charging party before the ALJ 
was that he was not provided with financial disclosure prior 
to the objection period. The ALJ concluded that, because 
charging party was not on the mailing list of current 
employees provided by the employer at the time that financial 
disclosure could or would have taken place, he would not have 
received financial disclosure even if it had issued. 
Accordingly, the ALJ found that UUP's failure to provide 
financial information to charging party prior to its 
objection period did not violate the Act as to him. 
The ALJ did, however, find that UUP's agency fee refund 
procedure for 1987-88 violated the Act when it failed to 
provide for the furnishing of financial information prior to 
the filing of objections by agency fee payers, and by failing 
to provide for an end-of-year correction in the amount of the 
agency fee refund. In so finding, the ALJ relied upon a 
decision of this Board, to which this charging party was also 
a party, in UUP (Eson, Barry, Gallup) , 20 PERB ^3052 (1987) . 
The ALJ concluded, however, that no further remedial action 
was required in this case because, in the earlier 
case (which was issued after UUP's 1987-88 procedure had 
been partially completed), the Board approved immediate 
prospective corrections in UUP's procedure to conform with 
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the Act.-2/ 
Charging party excepts to the ALT decision in three 
respects. First, he argues that the ALJ "erred in holding 
that the UUP's use of its internal union newspaper, 'The 
Voice', was sufficient to place agency fee payers on notice 
as to their statutory and constitutional rights ..'.." We 
have previously found the use of UUP' s newspaper as a means 
to communicate to all bargaining unit members its agency fee 
refund procedure to be in compliance with the Act.3-/ No 
ground has been offered here which would support reversal of 
this decision. We therefore deny the exception of the 
charging party in this respect. 
The second exception of charging party asserts that the 
ALT "erred in holding that the UUP did not have to take 
additional „steps to insure that actual notice and financial 
disclosure was received by Prof. Eson and other nonunion 
agency fee payers . . . ." We concur with the finding of the 
^/Although in UUP (Eson, Barry, Gallup). 20 PERB 53 039 
(1987), we had before us charges relating to UUP's agency fee 
refund procedure for fiscal years prior to and not including 
the 1987-88 year at issue here, the remedial relief ordered 
in that case relating to changes in UUP's procedure applied 
to the portions of the 1987-88 procedure which had not yet 
taken place, as well as for the years to come. See UUP 
(Eson, Barry, Gallup)f 20 PERB \3052 (1987), in which we 
approved (with certain conditions) a new procedure in 
accordance with our July 8 decision in the same case. 
•VuUP (Barrv) . 17 PERB 53102 (1984) . This decision was 
recently affirmed by this Board in UUP (Eson, Barry, Gallup), 
20 PERB ?[3039 (1987) , and was not appealed by the charging 
parties, including charging party Eson. 
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ALJ that UUP is entitled to rely upon the list of current 
employees provided to it bi-weekly by the employer as the 
basis for its mailing list to agency fee payers, and that the 
Act places it under no affirmative duty to seek out other 
persons who are not in payroll of "current employee" status. 
In fact, it would not be unreasonable for UUP to expect 
agency fee payers such as charging party to notify it of 
their desire to continue on mailing lists during extended 
periods of leave-without-pay, and to proffer current mailing 
addresses during such periods. 
In his third exception, charging party asserts that the 
ALJ erred in failing to order a refund of his agency fee for 
the 1987-88 fiscal year, having found that the agency fee 
refund procedure for 1987-88 improperly failed to provide for 
financial disclosure in advance of the objection period. 
In the context of UUP (Eson, Barry, Gallup), supra, we 
ordered UUP to cease and desist from utilizing an agency fee 
refund procedure which fails to conform to the Act in the 
respects asserted by charging party in this case, and 
directed UUP to develop an agency fee refund procedure in 
conformity "with the Act, to be implemented effective 
immediately. In a September 17, 1987 decision, we approved 
a new agency fee refund procedure submitted by UUP, which 
prospectively remedied the flaws complained of by charging 
party in the instant case. At issue, then, is whether 
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charging party is entitled to a refund of his agency fees 
paid for the 1987-88 fiscal year because the refund procedure 
promulgated by UUP for the year was, but is no longer, in 
violation of the Act. We find that it would not effectuate 
the policies of the Act in this case to require UUP to refund 
the agency"fees paid to date by charging party for the 1987-
88 fiscal year and we decline to exercise our discretion to 
order an agency fee refund. In view of the unintentional 
omission of his name from the mailing list of persons to whom 
financial disclosure and a copy of the agency fee refund 
procedure were to be sent, which we have found not to 
constitute an improper practice by UUP, charging party was 
not prejudiced in fact by the failure of UUP to provide for 
financial disclosure prior to the objection period in its 
procedure. The charging party's claim of failure to provide 
for end-of-year review of the advance reduction determination 
has already been remedied for the 1987-88 year in the context 
of our prior order, which requires UUP to conduct a year-end 
review for the 1987-88 year. No further relief is warranted 
in connection with this issue. 
The charging party's exceptions are denied and the 
decision of the ALT is affirmed for the reasons set forth 
herein. 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charge be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: March 11, 1988 
Albany, New York 
^ £> tfM/t-u^. 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of. 
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK Case No. S-0006 
for a determination pursuant to 
Section 212 of the Civil Service 
Law. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Pursuant to §212 of the Civil Service Law, the County of 
Suffolk has submitted an application by which it seeks a 
determination that its Local Law No. 4-1978, as amended on 
December 8, 1987 by Local Law No. 45-1987, is substantially 
equivalent to the provisions and procedures set forth in 
Article 14 of the Civil Service Law with respect to the 
State. Specifically, the amendment brings the County's local 
law into conformity with Chapter 204 of the Laws of 1987, 
which extended the Taylor Law's interest arbitration 
provisions for an additional two years. 
Having reviewed the application and having determined 
that the subject Local Law, as amended, is substantially 
equivalent to the provisions and procedures set forth in 
Article 14 of the Civil Service Law with respect to the 
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State, 
IT IS ORDERED that the application of the County of 
Suffolk be, and it hereby is, approved. 
s 
DATED: March 11, 1988 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3317 
TOWN OF PENFIELD, 
Employer. 
MARJORIE E. KAROWE, ESQ. for Petitioner 
HARRIS, BEACH, WILCOX, RUBIN AND LEVEY (JAMES CHARLES 
HOLAHAN, ESQ. of Counsel) for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
By decision dated February 1, 1988 .1/ the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
found that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (petitioner) has satisfied the 
requirements for certification without an election, and is 
entitled to be certified as the negotiating agent of the 
employees in a unit stipulated by the parties to consist of 
the following: 
Included: All full-time employees (that 
is, employees who regularly 
work at least 40 hours per 
week) employed in the Town of 
Penfield's Highway Department 
with the following titles: MEO 
I, MEO II, Laborer, and Senior 
Auto Mechanic. 
i / 2 1 PERB 5[4003 (1988) . 11471 
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Excluded: Supervisors, managerial and 
confidential employees, and all 
other employees. 
The Town of Penfield (employer) has filed exceptions to 
the Director's decision upon three grounds. First, the 
employer asserts that an election should be held in 
connection with petitioner's petition for certification 
because its showing of interest is "at best, marginal".-2-/ 
Second, the employer asserts that the evidence of majority 
status should be rejected, because it is not "current" within 
the meaning of §201.9(g) of PERB's Rules of Procedure 
(Rules). The employer's third exception asserts that the 
Director's decision implies that petitioner, if certified, 
will be designated as the exclusive negotiating agent of the 
employees in the stipulated bargaining unit, when in fact 
the employer never agreed that petitioner should be accorded 
exclusive rights of representation. 
The petitioner's response to the exceptions asserts only 
that it relies upon the Director's decision. 
The employer's first exception raises no valid challenge 
of the Director's decision. Section 201.9(g)(1) of our 
Rules provides that in the event of a choice to the employees 
in a negotiating unit between selection or rejection of a 
single employee organization, "The employee organization 
involved will be certified without an election if a mai ority 
-^/The petitioner has presented dues deduction authorization 
cards on behalf of 19 of the 31 persons in the unit 
stipulated to by the parties. MM «f 
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of the employees within the unit have indicated their choice 
by the execution of dues deduction authorization cards which 
are current, or by individual designation cards which have 
been executed within six months prior to the certification 
period" (emphases added). Our Rules provide no discretion to 
the Director to refuse certification in these circumstances 
if a majority of the employees in the unit indicate their 
choice of employee organization. Since a majority consists 
of more than 50%, and more than 50% of the persons in the 
bargaining unit in the instant case have indicated their 
choice of petitioner as their negotiating agent, the 
Director's decision fully conforms with our Rules in this 
respect, and the exception is accordingly denied. 
The employer's second exception claims, without any 
explanation or detail, that the dues deduction authorization 
cards submitted by petitioner are no longer current, and 
should accordingly not be considered in determining whether 
certification without election should take place. 
In Village of Websterf recently decided by this Board, 
we stated that individual designation cards must have been 
executed within six months prior to issuance of an Order of 
Certification by us, and that dues deduction authorization 
cards must *be current at the time of issuance of an Order of 
Certification before certification without an election can 
issue. We there stated that the term "current" has always 
been construed "to mean reasonably current, and certainly not 
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more than six months old, which is the limit contained in our 
Rules for the use of individual designation cards for 
certification without an election." Village of Webster, Case 
No. C-3226,- 21 PERB U[3002 (January 15, 1988) . In that case, 
we remanded the petition to the Director for further 
processing because, at the time of consideration of the 
request for an Order of Certification by this Board, the dues 
deduction authorization cards presented in support of the 
certification petition were more than six months old. In the 
instant case, the dues deduction authorization cards are not, 
as of the date of this decision, more than six months old, 
and are accordingly deemed to be current. We therefore find 
that certification at this time is in conformity with 
§201.9(g) of our Rules and the employer's exception is 
denied. 
Turning to the employer's final exception, we find no 
basis for the assertion that the Director's decision implies 
that the right of representation accorded in the Director's 
decision is exclusive. Nothing in the Director's decision so 
indicates, and it is well established that, in the absence of 
agreement to exclusivity by the employer, the right of 
representation is not exclusive in nature. Accordingly, the 
1/it is noteworthy that the employer presents no evidence 
or factual basis in support of its exception that the dues 
deduction authorizations presented by the petitioner are in 
fact not current or have been revoked, or that the 
composition of the bargaining unit has changed to the extent 
of affecting the petitioner's asserted majority status. 
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employer's third exception is also denied. Implicit in the 
right of representation which is not exclusive is the 
limitation of the right of representation to those persons in 
the designated unit who are members of the negotiating agent. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the exceptions are denied 
in their entirety, and 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as the representative of the 
employees in such unit who are members of the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances: 
Unit: Included: All full-time employees (that is, 
employees who regularly work at least 40 
hours per week) employed in the Town of 
Penfield * s Highway Department with the 
following titles: MEO I, MEO II, 
Laborer, and Senior Auto Mechanic 
Excluded: Supervisors, managerial and confidential 
employees, and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the Town of Penfield shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet 
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
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or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either 
party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree 
to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 11, 1988 
Albany, New York 
&&(?/$:» ALA^^L^^ cx^i^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
IA.— /*
 r 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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In the Matter of 
LYNDONVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer/Petitioner, 
CASE NO. C-3347 
- and -




On December 18, 1987, the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation issued a decision in the above 
matter finding that the petition filed by the Lyndonville 
Central School District (employer) to decertify the Lyndonville 
Non-Teaching Personnel Association as negotiating representative 
for certain of its employees should be granted for lack of 
opposition.£/ No exceptions have been filed to the decision. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Lyndonville Non-Teaching 
Personnel Association be, and it hereby is, decertified as the 
negotiating representative of the following unit of employees of 
the employer: 
l_l 20 PERB 5 4 0 8 6 ( 1 9 8 7 ) . 
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Included: Driver/Mechanic, Cleaner, Bus Driver, Aide, Clerk 
Typist, Typist, Account Clerk and School Nurse. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
DATED: March 11, 1988 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BUFFALO EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT TEAM, NEA/NY, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF BUFFALO, CASE NO. C-3323 
Employer, 
-and-
AFSCME, LOCAL 264, AFL-CIO, 
Tntervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees5 Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Buffalo Educational Support 
Team, NEA/NY has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All full-time teacher aides/school aides 
employed by the Board. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Buffalo Educational Support 
Team, NEA/NY. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 11, 1988 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Lrf_ 4~~ c 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
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In the Matter of 
LEWISTON-PORTER UNITED EDUCATIONAL 
EMPLOYEES, NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3335 
LEWISTON-PORTER CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKER'S,LOCAL 1, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Lewiston-Porter United 
Educational Employees, NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
Certification - C-3335 page 2 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All clerical employees, nurses, teacher aides, 
media associates and PDI aides regularly 
employed by the District. 
Excluded: Teaching assistants (including inhouse 
suspension supervisors), substitutes and 
temporary employees, confidential employees, 
managerial employees, administrative employees, 
supervisory employees and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Lewiston-Porter United 
Educational Employees, NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: March 11, 1988 
Albany, New York 
(U^^P hx %AA.J-HA„;(XSV<—y 
H a r o l d R. Newman, Chairman 
W a l t e r L. E i s e n b e r g , Meinber 
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